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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendants' Statement of Facts does not contradict the

Statement of Facts set forth by the Plaintiffs in their appeal
brief.

Defendants do, however, omit important facts and, at the

same time, ask the court to focus on facts that are irrelevant.
Because the Defendants do not claim to disagree with Plaintiffs'
fact statement, Plaintiffs will address some of the omitted and
irrelevant facts within the body of this response to Defendants'
reply brief. The remaining omitted facts have been laid out in
Plaintiffs' appeal brief and in their memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment.
Defendants argue in their brief that the Plaintiffs' appeal
should fail for the following reasons: A) Plaintiffs have not
disputed the facts of the closing; B) Plaintiffs did not prove in
their reply memorandum to Defendants' motion for summary judgment
that the Earnest Money Agreement (Agreement) exists to support
their suit.
A.

The Plaintiffs have presented factual issues surrounding the
closing that preclude summary judgment.
(1)

The Closing Instructions.

Defendants failed to mention

in their argument that the Plaintiffs submitted closing
instructions, prior to the closing of the transaction, which
protected the Plaintiffs' right to pursue their claims. The
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effect of these instructions and the intent and understanding of
the parties regarding these instructions are issues of fact
related to the closing.
Plaintiffs have based their claims in part upon the actions
of the Defendants prior to closing and at the closing, in
addition to the documents, including the "closing instructions."
Plaintiffs set forth the facts of Defendants' actions and their
possible legal consequence in Plaintiff's appeal brief and in
their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment.

For example,

Defendants do not claim that they did not see the closing
instructions or fail to understand their meaning and intent.
Defendants had no doubt that the Plaintiffs would not have closed
the transaction if the Defendants had objected to the terms of
the closing instructions.(R. 169) The Defendants do not claim
that they stated any objections to the Plaintiffs at closing or
that they said or did anything that would indicate that they did
not agree to the terms of the closing instructions.
Accordingly, the following issues of fact related to the
closing remain:
1.

Whether the defendants intended and understood that the
Plaintiffs' closing instructions were to survive the closing
and protect Plaintiffs' claims concerning the "bargain."

2.

Whether the defendants understood and agreed to close
subject to the terms of the closing instructions.
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Defendants argue that because the closing instructions were
not signed by the defendants or incorporated into the final
documents, they are irrelevant. Defendants submit no support for
this argument. Indeed, the closing instructions did not need to
be signed by the Defendants in order for the instructions to be
enforceable and valid. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Section 185 (parties
may become bound by terms of a contract, even though they do not
sign it, where their assent is otherwise indicated). Nor did the
closing instructions need to be incorporated into the deed to
survive the closing. Both the Earnest Money Agreement and the
Real Estate Purchase Contract have provisions stating that they
survive the closing even though they were never incorporated into
the deed.
(2) The Earnest Money Agreement.

The Defendants argue that

the Earnest Money Agreement was not in existence at the time of
the closing because it had expired on October 21, 1993.
Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants, by agreeing to a later
closing date, effectively extended the closing date, waived any
claim that the Agreement expired and waived any right to enforce
the earlier closing date. Waiver is a "highly fact-dependent
question." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
Therefore, additional issues of fact remain concerning the
closing:
1.

Whether the Defendants and the Plaintiffs agreed to extend
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the closing date.
2.

Whether the Defendants waived any claim that the Agreement
had expired prior to the actual closing date.

3.

Whether the Defendants waived any right to enforce an
earlier closing date.
Defendants' contention that the Plaintiffs raised no issues

of fact concerning the closing is erroneous.

Their argument on

this point is without merit.
B.

Plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to prove the
existence of the Earnest Money Agreement.
Defendants7 argue that Plaintiffs's claims are utterly

dependent upon the existence of the Earnest Money Agreement.
This is not true. As one can see from the briefs filed in this
case, the history of this deal involved more than the signing of
the Earnest Money Agreement.

The Earnest Money Agreement in

whole or in part is only one factor of the Plaintiffs' fraud and
misrepresentation claims. As set forth in Plaintiffs' opposing
memorandum and in Plaintiffs' brief, the actions of the
Defendants and statements other than the Earnest Money Agreement
form the basis for these claims.
Defendants argue that the trial court's ruling granting the
Defendants' summary judgment is a correct one because the
Plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of the Earnest Money
Agreement.
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate only if there
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is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Harriaan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App.1994).
given to the trial court's ruling.

Id.

Shafir v.

No deference is

The facts and the

reasonable inferences therefrom are reviewed in the light most
favorable to the losing party.

Id.

To defeat Defendants' motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs were not required to "prove" their case; they had only
to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
would bear the burden of proof at trial."

Schafir v. Harriaan,

879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah App. 1994). Only one competent sworn
statement disputing the averments of the other party is
sufficient to create an issue of fact.

Redevelopment Agency v.

Daskalas, 758 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989).
In their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment,
Plaintiffs presented meaningful documentary evidence, affidavits
and deposition statements showing that there were issues of fact
regarding the Earnest Money Agreement, including, but not limited
to the following: 1) whether the parties closed the transaction
subject to closing instructions which referred to the bargain
contained in the Earnest Money Agreement; 2) whether Defendants,
by their actions, extended the closing date of the Earnest Money
Agreement; 3) whether the Defendants committed fraud and
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negligent misrepresentation; and 4) whether the Defendants' fraud
and negligent misrepresentation disarm the doctrine of merger.
The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' appeal should
fail because they did not present evidence sufficient to prove
their claims is without merit. Plaintiffs' appeal is based on a
summary judgment ruling; the Plaintiffs were deprived of an
evidentiary and of any opportunity to prove the facts supporting
their complaint.

However, it is clear that Plaintiffs did

produce sufficient evidence to establish the elements of their
claims at the time of summary judgment.
II.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF TACITLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT GENUINE ISSUES
OF FACT REMAIN WHICH RENDER THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ERRONEOUS.
In Plaintiffs' brief, Plaintiff laid out genuine and

remaining issues of fact.

In their response brief, Defendants

respond by arguing or ignoring the facts, not the law, thereby
tacitly acknowledging that factual issues remain.
A.

The Factual Issue of Defendants' Breach.
Defendants argue that they did not breach the Earnest Money

Agreement because the description of property in it did not
include the parcel of land designated as "Lot 15."

Defendants'

statement is in error. As stated previously in Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts section of their brief, the Earnest Money
Agreement included a document entitled

"Addendum/Counteroffer"

which stated that it was incorporated into the Agreement and
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which contained specific language referring to Lot 15 as part of
the property to be included in the purchase.
Defendants' statement that the Earnest Money Agreement
itself did not refer to Lot 15 is misleading, as is Defendants'
omission of the fact that Plaintiffs and Defendants believed that
the Earnest Money Agreement property description included and
described Lot 15 at the time the Agreement was prepared and
executed.

Whether Defendants breached their Agreement is a

question of fact which can only be resolved by a trier of fact.
B. The Waiver of Defendants.
Defendants argue that the Earnest Money Agreement expired on
its own terms on October 21, 1993.

The basis for this claim is

that the Defendants did not sign a written extension.
written extension is not necessary.

A signed,

See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Section

185.
A waiver may be express or implied.

Soter's v. Deseret

Federal Savings & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993).

A party

asserting waiver need not prove that the other party intended to
waive a particular right, only that the waiving party intended to
relinquish a right.
dependent."

Id.

This legal question is "intensely fact-

Soter's at 940.

The trier of fact need only to

"determine whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants
the inference of relinquishment.'"
942.
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(Emphasis added.) Soter' s at

In this case, Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff Maynard
stated in his affidavit that the parties met, were unable to
close and agreed to meet again, which they did on October 25,
1993.

Defendants' brief at 11.

Defendants then state that

Plaintiff Maynard did not testify that the Defendants did not
agree to extend the Earnest Money Agreement and "in fact, they
did not."

Defendants' brief at 11.

Defendants offer no

refutation of Plaintiff Maynard's' affidavit testimony other than
their claim, on appeal, that they did not so agree.

Defendants

do not deny that the two meetings took place and that the closing
occurred at a later date with their agreement.
claim to have objected to a later closing date.

Defendants do not
The facts would

show that Defendants conducted themselves at all times as if the
Earnest Money Agreement continued in full force and they did not
allege that it had terminated prior to October 25, 1993 until
their motion for summary judgment.
Defendants have not made a legal argument on the issue of
waiver; they presented a factual argument. Obviously the
Defendants recognize that the issue of waiver can be decided only
by addressing the facts of this case.
C.

The Doctrine of Merger and the Closing Instructions
Defendants claim that whether or not the Earnest Money

Agreement's closing date was extended is moot because of the
doctrine of merger and abrogation.
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As support for their claim,

they cite Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994),
wherein the court affirmed the doctrine of merger and its
applicability when the acts to be performed by the seller relate
only to the delivery of title to the buyer.
In Schafir, the plaintiffs purchased a home previously owned
by the defendants.

After the purchase, plaintiffs discovered,

among other defects, that the plumbing did not conform to code.
Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached a warranty
statement contained in Section C of the Earnest Money Agreement.
At the time of closing, plaintiffs received and accepted a
warranty deed for the property. The court held that, under the
doctrine of merger and pursuant to the abrogation clause in the
Earnest Money Agreement, the warranty contained in the Earnest
Money Agreement was extinguished by the warranty deed accepted at
the closing.
While Plaintiffs certainly accept the existence and
definition of the doctrine of merger in Utah, the facts of the
case at bar differ significantly from the facts in Schafir.
Plaintiffs are not alleging that it did not receive title to the
property that Defendants ultimately conveyed at the closing nor
are Plaintiffs claiming defects in the property discovered only
after the purchase.

Plaintiffs filed suit because they entered

into a real estate transaction for certain property allegedly
owned by the Defendants.

Following weeks of negotiations and
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representations by Defendants, including an executed Earnest
Money Agreement, Plaintiffs learned that the Defendants would not
convey a crucial lot because they did not own it.

Plaintiffs

elected to tender performance and sued for breach, but Plaintiffs
tendered such performance only after submitting closing
instructions reserving their claims and ensuring that the
applicable terms of the Earnest Money Agreement survived the
closing.
In Secor v. Knight, 719 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986), the Knights
purchased property in a subdivision on which they built a home
with a rental apartment in the basement.

Other owners in the

subdivision filed for an injunctive order against the Knights on
the basis that a rental apartment violated the restrictive
covenants of the subdivision. The Knights filed a third-party
complaint against the developer alleging fraud. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the developer had
not been fraudulent, despite conflicting evidence, and thus, the
doctrine of merger applied to bar the Knights' recovery. Secor at
794.

Although it was not a clear cut case, the Supreme Court did

not disturb the trial court's findings because the evidence did
not preponderate to the level that a manifest injustice had
occurred.

Id.

However, the Supreme Court noted that the

Knights, the purchasers of the property, might have been able to
avoid the "harsh result" of the merger doctrine if they would
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have been more diligent in protecting their rights.

Secor at

795.
In this case, Plaintiffs have diligently protected their
rights by raising their objections and concerns and by submitting
closing instructions giving the Defendants notice of their intent
to pursue their claims against the Defendants.
The Defendants' only basis for their contention that the
closing instructions fail to protect the Plaintiffs7 claim from
merger and abrogation is that Defendants did not sign or
incorporate them. As discussed previously, it is not necessary
for the Defendants to have signed or incorporated the closing
instructions in order for them to be effective.
Whether the parties intended the closing instructions
protected the Plaintiffs' rights and claims and whether the
parties closed subject to the conditions in the closing
instructions are not issues relating to the title of the property
Defendants ultimately conveyed. They are collateral issues to
which the doctrine of merger does not apply.

See Secor at 793.

Finally, Plaintiffs have sued on the basis of negligent
misrepresentation and fraud. The Defendants acknowledge that in
situations where fraud is present, the doctrine of merger and
abrogation will not apply.
Consequently, issues of fact remain which require an
evidentiary hearing and which cannot be resolved appropriately
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via summary judgment.
D.

Defendants' Negligence and Misrepresentation
Defendants do not address these claims in their brief; they

have chosen to argue that the Earnest Money Agreement and its
termination or merger is the sole factor for the court of appeals
to consider.

The Plaintiffs request that the court take note

that the Defendants do not dispute the facts as set forth by the
Plaintiffs.

In their Statement of Facts, the Defendants have

elected to omit facts, but they offer no evidence that would
contradict the facts presented by Plaintiffs.
As discussed above and in Plaintiffs' brief, genuine issues
of fact remained at the time the lower court entered summary
judgment.

Consequently, Defendants' brief does not and cannot

address only issues of law; they only argue facts. The order of
summary judgment is inappropriate and must be vacated.
II.

THE JUDGE'S ORDER IMPROPERLY CONTAINS FACTUAL FINDINGS.
Defendants' argument that the order entered on summary

judgment was proper consists of restating the order and making
the statement that the order does not contain factual findings.
Defendants offer no other support.
The Plaintiff is at a loss to explain how the Defendants, in
good faith, can claim that a summary judgment order that reaches
findings based on issues of honesty, good faith and fair dealing,
and that ignores the actions and statements of Defendants, as
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well as the totality of the circumstances, is a proper one that
deals only with questions of law. The lower court's order, as
prepared by the Defendants, makes a factual finding on the
applicability of merger, despite Plaintiffs' claims of fraud. The
order makes a factual finding that the Defendants did not breach
their Agreement with Plaintiffs, while, at the same time,
acknowledging that the Defendants did not convey the property
promised in the Earnest Money Agreement. The order makes a
factual finding on the effectiveness of the closing instructions,
without addressing, among other factors, the intent and
understanding of the parties.

The order makes a finding that

there was no waiver, even though, by definition of this court,
the issue of waiver is a question of fact. The order makes a
factual finding that the Defendants did not engage in
misrepresentation or fraud.
Defendants' statement of propriety is not sufficient to save
the order. The order clearly contains factual findings that are
inappropriate on summary judgment.
III. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS IMPROPER.
A.

The Defendants have no basis to request attorney fees.
The Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney

fees.

Plaintiffs addressed this issue at length in their brief

and will herein address only Defendants' use of Redeve1opment
Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah App.1989) as support for
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their argument that they should be allowed to claim attorney fees
on the basis of the attorney fees provision of the Earnest Money
Agreement while, at the same time, asserting that the Earnest
Money Agreement merged into the final documents at closing and
was thus extinguished.
In Redevelopment, the Tenants sought compensation from the
Owners of the real property for "bonus value" based upon the
Tenants' purported renewal of their leases.

The court found that

the Tenants failed to comply with the terms of the leases
required to effectively renew;, thus they were precluded from
receiving bonus value payments. Jd at 1125. Because the Owners
incurred costs to enforce the terms of the lease in order to
withstand the Tenants' claims for additional monies, the court
held that the Owners were entitled to fees under the attorney
fees provision of the lease. Although the lease had terminated
upon the occupation of the premises by the Redevelopment Agency,
the court held that because the Owners did not rescind or void
the lease, the law that "a party who deems a contract void for
one purpose cannot subsequently rely upon that contract to
support another purpose" was inapplicable.

Id.

Defendants' reliance on Redevelopment for their claim of
attorney fees is not well-taken.

In Redevelopment, the contract

was a lease agreement with which the Tenants failed to comply.
The Owners did not claim that the lease agreements were void;
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they did not seek to avoid any of their responsibilities under
the leases and then invoke the leases to recover from the
Tenants.
In the case at bar, Defendants were the ones who breached
the Earnest Money Agreement by failing to convey the property
promised and bargained for in the Agreement.
Unlike the Owners in Redevelopment, Defendants have not
incurred costs and fees to enforce the Earnest Money Agreement.
Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs breached the abrogation
provision of the Agreement when they filed their suit and that in
seeking to enforce that provision, the Defendants have incurred
expenses. Plaintiff did not "breach" the abrogation provision of
the Agreement. Plaintiffs cannot "breach" where there is no
contractual obligation: the doctrine of merger and abrogation is
a legal fiction that may or may not apply according to the facts.
See Secor. Also, unlike the Owners in Redevelopment, the
Defendants have claimed that the Earnest Money Agreement is no
longer enforceable because of the doctrine of merger and the
abrogation clause contained in the Agreement.
Consequently, this case is similar to the situation of the
plaintiffs in Schafir who sought to enforce the warranty
provision of the Earnest Money Agreement.

Schafir v. Harricran,

879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). The court held that because the
Earnest Money Agreement merged into the final closing documents,
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the plaintiffs could not assert the warranty provision in the
Agreement. The plaintiffs could only assert any claims they may
have had under the warranty deed produced and accepted at the
closing.
Accordingly, if Defendants are correct in their assertion of
merger, then the abrogation clause ceased to exist at the time of
closing and Defendants cannot claim that the Plaintiffs somehow
breached it at a later date.
B.

The award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion by the
lower court.
While Plaintiffs agree that an award of attorney fees should

not be overturned absent a "clear abuse of discretion," an "award
made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of
discretion and must be overruled."

Redevelopment Agency v.

Daskalas, 758 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989).

In the Redevelopment

case, the appeals court noted that the attorney fee affidavits
were quite detailed and specified the work actually performed in
connection with the litigation.

Redevelopment at 1126. However,

the court reversed the lower court's ruling on attorney fees
because u[i]t takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an
issue of fact.'' Id.
In this case, the attorney fee affidavits submitted to the
lower court were not detailed, nor did they specify which hours
applied to which claim. Plaintiffs filed an objection and an
16

affidavit from another attorney supporting their objections.
Although Mr. Aagard filed a reply, Mr. Biesinger never responded
to Plaintiffs' objections.
Plaintiffs addressed the specific inadequacies of the fee
affidavits in their brief and in their objection filed with the
lower court; for example, the fee affidavits contain fees and
costs unattached to enforcing the abrogation provision of the
Earnest Money Agreement, the fee affidavits include time spent on
unsuccessful motions, the billing statements fail to break out
the spent by counsel on each of Plaintiff's claims, the fee
affidavits included unrecoverable costs, and the fee affidavits
contain inflated or fraudulent charges.
Defendants' fee affidavits are insufficient to support the
lower court's award of fees; in addition, Plaintiffs have
submitted objections and a sworn statement that is more than
sufficient to create an issue of fact. The lower court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees without adequate basis and
in the face of competent objections.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' response brief fails to provide the court with
any justification for the lower court's ruling on summary
judgment.

Because of the importance and numerosity of the

remaining issues of fact that were before the trial court,
Defendants are reduced, in their brief, to repeating the trial
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court's order and findings, as if doing so will convince the
appeals court to ignore the standard of review, the facts, and
the procedures of this case. Defendants do not dispute
Plaintiffs' Statement of Fact; they omit key facts and focus on
inconsequential ones.
Plaintiffs provided the lower court with more than
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of each element of
their claims.

Plaintiffs objected with sworn affidavits to

Defendants' fee affidavits.

Before the trial court, Defendants

failed to meet their burden of proving that no genuine issues of
fact existed.

Defendants cannot reasonably contend that the

appeals court should turn away from such an obviously improper
order as that entered by the trial court in this case.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court vacate the
trial court's order and remand the case for trial.
Dated this 20th day of September, 1995.

Robe rtxl^^V^idfe
Attorney for Appellants
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